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Abstract. This paper attempts to show why it is highly unlikely that a disaster can become a
catastrophe. We first put forward an economic concept of disaster localization. This shows
that a localized disaster is unlikely to affect the macro economy in any significant way and
that economic development itself tends to make most disasters localized as an incidental
consequence of its endogenous processes. We then show that the effect of current
globalization on vulnerability seems to be double-edged. It may increase local vulnerability
by disenfranchising communities and adding new sources of economic instability. But it may
also speed up the downgrading of vulnerability at the national level by contributing to
upgrade localization, further reducing the possibility of a catastrophe. It is therefore, difficult
to imagine a realistic scenario in which a disaster could become catastrophic, even less so in
developed countries.
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1. Introduction
This paper attempts to show, from an economic viewpoint, why it is highly unlikely that a
disaster can become a catastrophe. We start from a number of definitions and
conceptualizations, and then approach the issue by putting forward an economic concept of
disaster localization. This shows that a localized disaster is unlikely to affect the macro
economy in any significant or persistent way and that economic development itself tends to
make most disasters localized as an incidental consequence of its endogenous processes. As
economic resilience and economic disaster confinement increase, disaster vulnerability is
bound to decrease. However, the effect of current globalization on vulnerability seems to be
double edged. On the one hand, globalization may increase local vulnerability by
disenfranchising communities and adding new sources of economic instability, increasing
early disaster effects. But on the other, globalization is likely to speed up the downgrading of
vulnerability at the national level by contributing to upgrade localization, further reducing the
possibility of a catastrophe.
Catastrophe: for the purpose of this paper, let us define a catastrophe, as an extreme and
sudden disaster, the intensity of which affects a social system in such a way that:
(i)  the endogenous (in-built) capacity and the exogenous (policy) options of the system
are greatly surpassed, i.e. most economic resources become unavailable (destroyed,
damaged, inaccessible or immobilised) and most normal institutions become
fragmented and ineffective (failure of normal rules and  incapability of governance),
so further systemic disintegration and deterioration is unstoppable,
(ii)  assuming that the initial impact was local (in our sense below), the localised failure is
so intense that it pervades the whole system in the same way as (i), i.e. the system has
no viability within the same institutional arrangements and resources, so
(iii)  external aid (even if available) cannot re-ignite the system, but could at most support
its (helpless) victims.
That is to say, the system stops operating as such, requiring a fundamental change, which is a
long term and costly endeavour. This can be the case of a harshly defeated country in a war,
like Germany after WWI, or the destruction of the institutional cohesiveness of a multi-
nationality/ethnic country, like Yugoslavia after the Soviet Union demise (Albala-Bertrand,
2000a) or Iraq after 2003 invasion.  But this scenario is unlikely in the case of natural or
technological disasters, as explained below.
2. Some Conceptualizations
2.1. Urban Area and Urban Hazard
Urban Area. An urban area or city can be represented as a high concentration of people and
artifacts in an articulated set of built-up environment, within a relatively small and confined
geographic area, within which and through which societal activities are carried. This
articulated set of construction can be described as a collection of service networks and service
sources that support societal activities, mostly confined in residential construction and
business buildings, like homes, social buildings, public and private offices and factory plants.
The main service networks in urbanized areas are transport, utilities and communication.
Likewise, service processing and sources come in the shape of power plants, equipment and
reservoirs for the supply of electricity, gas, telecommunications and water, which are critical
for safety considerations. In addition, the treatment of sewage and rubbish take up urban land3
and may be a source of contamination if not properly tackled. Furthermore, all urban activities
require machinery and equipment so that institutions and people can carry societal and living
functions. These represent the standard categories of the capital stock, i.e. business fixed
capital in machinery & equipment, structural capital (plant, infrastructures, overheads, offices
and social physical capital) and residential capital (dwellings). Behind all this are people as
both workforce and beneficiaries of urban activities. A disaster can directly affect people and
the capital stock, affecting indirectly their wider functions, as a consequence of the
disarticulation of societal frameworks wrought by the initial direct losses.
Urban Hazard. An urban hazard can become a major disaster if it involves a capital city or
large industrial cities. In the discussion below we focus mostly on major disaster impacts,
which may be the source of a potential catastrophe, as defined above. We conventionally
define a disaster impact as major if the money estimate of direct losses is at least similar to the
average GDP growth rate of the affected country, e.g. a 5 percent of GDP. We also consider
as major, a disaster that damages a key economic activity, even if the direct losses are not as
large. Table 1 below, which is self-explanatory, accounts for the main types of hazards that
can affect a country and some useful general characteristic associated with them.  Only some
of these potential disasters are relevant for urban areas, but the table can be used as a general
reference tool. In this paper we only concentrate on sudden types of natural and technological
disasters, which may affect cities, unless otherwise is indicated.4
Among natural hazards affecting urban areas, the potentially most intense is the earthquake.
Along coastal towns there would also be the possibility of earthquake- or volcano -inducing
tsunamis. In certain latitudes, there may also be the possibility of hurricanes. In addition,
some towns located in certain types of ground relief, like floodplains, may be subject to
serious but confined floods, but this would generally be less likely in large cities, let alone the
capital city (hurricane Katrina-induced flooding in New Orleans is an exception to note). In
general, infrequent but damaging flooding mostly occur in the areas around main riverbanks.
Except for volcanoes in very particular locations (e.g. 1995 Monserrat), and the very remote
case of asteroids, other natural phenomena would unlikely qualify as a major urban potential
disaster, let alone potential catastrophe. Technological hazards, in turn, which can become
serious urban disasters, can be classified into the following categories. Engineering disasters,
stemming from the failure of buildings, bridges or other construction works like levees
(Katrina-induced flooding being again a case to note). Chemical disasters caused by slow
pollution and sudden contamination of air, land or water. Biological disasters stemming from
virus release or urban deforestation. Nuclear disasters caused from radioactive fallout,
radioactive waste or contamination. A good deal of these disasters is associated with the
production, containment and use of energy. It is however unlikely that any of this can
realistically become a catastrophe, as defined above.
2.2. Disaster and Catastrophe: A Question of Vulnerability
Disaster. A disaster impact is normally the result of a physically or societally uncompensated
tension, which translates into death, damage, destruction and the disarticulation of societal
frameworks. In the case of natural disasters the uncompensated tension is due to the physical
weakness of structures and societal processes that fail to compensate for extreme natural
events, like earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and the like. As such, even if the natural event
were fully exogenous to society, the physical resistance to geophysical phenomenon would
not be. It depends on both disaster-proof technology and sociopolitical access to it, which is
mostly an endogenous societal process. This is also the case of technological disasters, but
here the inducing phenomenon is also fully endogenous. This is associated with the
institutional failure to master the production, containment and use of risky technology. In
turn, a socially/politically induced disaster impact, like riots, civil wars, wars and the like (i.e.
“complex humanitarian emergencies”) is normally the result of a societal/institutional
weakness that fails to accommodate competing identity groups. This is a fully endogenous
phenomenon, in-built in social structure and dynamics. We generally exclude the latter, as it
has characteristics of its own, which are beyond this presentation (see Albala-Bertrand,
2000a; 2000b)
Vulnerability. We generically define vulnerability as the exposure of both physical and
societal frameworks to violent events. The latter refers to the exposure of institutions and
organized people to violent or extreme events. The degree of exposure is in turn associated
with the risk of failure (or dislocation) of an item (or framework) caused by the impact a
potential event of a given magnitude. Society’s physical arrangements are paramount in
explaining disaster damage. But these are the result of societal processes that confine people
and activities to a physically vulnerable built-up environment and unsafe technology or to
societal processes that increasingly weaken the physical environment where people live and
work. These societal processes are the result of prevailing institutions, and in turn these
institutional arrangements are paramount in explaining resilience and recovery from a disaster
impact. This gives rise to two not independent types of vulnerability: physical and societal.5
The main processes behind physical vulnerability to both natural and technological hazards
are unsafe living quarters (building quality and location) and unsafe economic activities
(engineering quality and location of structures and risky processes). In turn the main societal
factors behind societal vulnerability, which may increase the proneness and destructiveness of
disasters, are entitlement erosion (economic and political possessions, access and rights) and
environmental degradation (pollution, deforestation, overcrowding and the like).  These four
factors are the result of society’s processes of production and reproduction, which may
differentially affect some individuals and groups as well as increase overall risk in
unpredictable ways. Hence, whatever the potential unleashing event (geophysical,
technological or political), the proneness of the social/physical system and its increased
vulnerability to such events are largely part and parcel of prevailing institutional frameworks
and tendencies. It is therefore society itself that, by creating and modifying institutions, may
increase or reduce its proneness and vulnerability to geophysical and socially made events
(Albala-Bertrand, 1993, 2000a, 2000b).
Lack of political influence, lack of economic alternatives, poverty and overall societal
disenfranchising may be at the foundation of vulnerability, especially at a local level. A good
deal of increased vulnerability and disaster risk can be attributed to the wholesale policy
rearrangements demanded and imposed by a socially unconcerned globalization. This is
translated into a policy inconsistency, in which institutional rearrangements are imposed with
a pace and extent that are significantly faster, deeper and wider than the ability of the most
vulnerable people (and their activities) to adapt and accommodate within a minimum of
stability. This often puts people and their livelihood in both precarious conditions and a safety
vacuum, which could be aggravated by a synchronic downward business cycle (Albala-
Bertrand, 2006).
Economic Catastrophe. Given our definition above, for a localized disaster to become an
economic catastrophe, three conditions are required.
(i)  Direct (stock) effects have to be widespread, massive or pivotal.
(ii)  Indirect (flow or functioning) effects have to be uncontainable.
(iii)  Institutional effects have to be so perverse that recovery (economic rehabilitation and
reconstruction) becomes unachievable
(1). So relief must be the most that external aid,
if available, can aspire.
Let us then show why such a scenario, or any in such a direction, is implausible in general, let
alone in developed countries.
3. Disaster Localization: A Description from an Economic Viewpoint   
In most studies, the use of the word localization usually refers to the geographic extent of
either the event or the disaster impact itself. Given that this type of extent does not appear to
mean much in the absence of the type of economy that is within the affected area, we define a
disaster as localized if it affects a confined area of economic activity. This implies that a
geographically widespread disaster can be economically localized (e.g. a drought in a
diversified country), or widespread (e.g. a drought in an agriculturally undiversified least
developed country, like a Sahelian country).6
TABLE 2: The Issue of Localization*
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e.g. drought in Uruguay or hurricane in El
Salvador)
e.g. Dominica (in later years)
(22)
-Undiversified Agricultural Economy
e.g. Malawi (in earlier years) and Sahelian
countries
-Small Islands (with diversification)
e.g. Dominica (earlier years) and Monserrat’s
volcano
*This classification refers only to direct disaster effects (stock effects). Notice also that some countries are
underlined when they appear in two different cells at different times. This is to show how similar disasters are
likely to become more localized over time, as countries both generally develop and specifically protect against
hazards.
Our concept of localization corresponds to the 1
st column of the Table 2, i.e. economic
localization: cells (11) and (21).  This also shows that a disaster can be economically
localized, whether it is geographically localized or not. Cell (11) shows the most common
case, as it is likely that the majority of geographically localized disasters are also
economically localized. As examples, we can focus on Bangladesh (especially floods and
cyclones) and Malawi (droughts). Since the 1990s these countries underwent geographically
localized disasters, which had severe impact in the affected areas, but did not translate into
significant losses for the economy as a whole. The initial impacts were short-lived and more
than compensated within a year or so. This is also the case of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia,
which would have been localized even without the over-generous aid committed by the rest of
the world. Cell (12) shows that some geographically localized disasters can also be
economically widespread if they strike a key industry (normally an exporting one, like oil,
bananas, etc) or a main industrial/political city (normally the capital city). For example, in
1987, an earthquake in Ecuador damaged the main oil pipe for this export. This is however a
rare event, as even when major earthquakes struck a capital city (e.g. Managua 1972,
Guatemala City 1976, Mexico City 1985) they do not translate into widespread economic
effects, so this is more possibility than necessity. Another possibility would be the cyclone
and floods in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) contributing to the separatist momentum and
civil war of independence in early 1970s. The disasters appear to have acted as triggers of a
growing institutional conflict with West Pakistan (Albala-Bertrand, 1993). But the above
disasters were geographically localized, which in normal times would unlikely create7
significant widespread effects on the polity, let alone the macroeconomy, as was indicated in
the previous point.
Cell (21) shows that geographically widespread disasters can also be economically localized.
This is the case when a geographically widespread disaster strikes a diversified economy,
mainly affecting one economic sector, normally the agricultural sector (e.g. droughts in Latin
America or even widespread hurricanes in diversified islands like Dominica since the 1980s).
It would be unusual that this unleashes important macroeconomic effects, unless the affected
sector was pivotal for the rest of the economy, which is unlikely in diversified open
economies. Notice also that even when one sector or industry undergoes the brunt of damage
from a sudden disaster, like a flood or an earthquake, this sector would unlikely be fully
impaired, as disaster impact effects are never homogeneous.  Finally, cell  (22) represents the
case of geographically widespread disasters that also have an economically widespread
impact. This normally refers to a geographically widespread disaster that strikes an
undiversified agricultural economy (e.g. droughts in Sahelian countries) or a small semi-
diversified island (e.g. hurricanes in small Caribbean islands, like St Lucia and Dominica in
the late 1970s - fishing, agriculture and tourism might suffer badly). It also includes rare
events like the Monserrat’s volcano in 1995. The latter would have been widespread however
diversified the economy was at the time, as all sectors would have suffered total or partial
impairment, which might be expected to cause structural change (Benson & Clay, 2004).
Significant structural change in the wake of this disaster would be an indicator of its
catastrophic nature.  In most cases of widespread disaster, however, the persistence of the
macroeconomic effects, whether positive or negative, would be confined to around two to
three years after the disaster impact, except in slowly developing disaster like droughts
(Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Benson & Clay, 2004).  So only cases in cell (22), and to a lesser
extent in cell (21), might satisfy the basic conditions required for a disaster to become a
catastrophe, as defined above. But even here this is unlikely, as explained later.
We can also see in Table 2 that some disaster-prone countries, which were located in cells
(12) and (22) in early years, reappear in cell (11) or (21) in later years, i.e. the countries
undergo more localized disasters from similar natural events over time. For example, Malawi
moves from (22) to (11), while Dominica does from (22) to (21) and Bangladesh from (12) to
(21). This is an indication that for disaster-prone countries, as a rule, development can be
conceived as a process that transforms all types of disaster into economically localized ones,
i.e. towards cells  (11) and (21). This appears to have been the case of the three countries
mentioned above (Benson & Clay, 2004). This is then also an indication that development and
reduced macroeconomic vulnerability to disasters might go hand in hand. This process would
be reinforced and sped up by disaster policies that explicitly seek such an outcome, but such
policies are more likely to come up in the aftermath of large natural disasters than in normal
times. In what follows the term “disaster zone” is used for any stock affected by the initial
impact, whether this is located within a given geographic area or not.
4. An Explanation of the Social/Economic Nature of Disaster Localization
4.1. Isolation and Insulation
An isolated, autarkic, local economy cannot by definition have spreading effects towards the
national economy. If it happened to be affected by a disaster, however large its direct or stock
effects, the indirect effects would be contained within its boundaries, which may make the
total local effects more intense. Without outside aid and endogenous macro integrative8
reactions, the recovery would likely be more trying, as it would have to be met with resources
and reactions within the local economy alone. From the viewpoint of the (national)
macroeconomy, the disaster would be localized and unintrusive. Contrariwise, if the local
economy is integrated to the national economy via mutual demands and supplies of factors,
goods and finance, then the disaster can remain local only insofar as the indirect spreading
effects can be contained within the disaster (economic or geographic) zone boundary. From a
national standpoint, the disaster would be localized if the macroeconomy could insulate itself
from the indirect effects that originate in the disaster zone. For this to happen, the national
economy has to create compensations via in-built economic and other societal reactions,
which in addition are likely to be reinforced by exogenous domestic and foreign responses.
This would initially insulate the disaster, and later help recover the disaster zone itself. The
basic containment of wider indirect effects would normally occur rapidly via relief and local
physical rehabilitation, during which the macroeconomic organism would already be taking
care of itself via normal endogenous market and non-market mechanisms.
4.2. Disaster Escalation
Analytically, a sudden disaster impact can only escalate into a larger disaster via indirect
effects. That is, the damage caused on capital stocks and people by a direct impact is bound to
impair functioning processes and flows (production, distribution, exchange, and the like). But
if these are systemically counteracted at local level or compensated at national level, then the
macroeconomy would unlikely be affected, and therefore a potential escalation into a larger
disaster, let alone a catastrophe, would not be realized.
We expect that a more developed country will be more economically diversified and more
internally and externally articulated. This will make both its inter-industrial and income
linkages more all embracing and dynamic, less dependent on given domestic sources, and not
least its people will more likely be institutionally integrated to a more responsive center of
allegiance or state. This means that a disaster might have the possibility of spreading via
linkages to the wider economy, through indirect or flow effects, which would not happen
from an autarkic location. But at the same time the inter-linked system is likely to generate
market endogenous reactions via buffer stocks, substitutions and new supply/demand
opportunities that would dampen down negative effects. In addition, other in-built or
institutional mechanisms, plus the standard exogenous ones, would respond in the same
direction (Albala-Bertrand, 1993). That is why, in this conception, both indirect effects and
long-term effects from localized disasters are likely to be unimportant for the macroeconomy.
In diversified economies they would be rapidly compensated and outweighed, even in the
disaster zone itself. So the direct disaster stock loss, which is associated with residential,
infrastructure, social, business and inventory capital, plus current production and labor, might
represent almost all of the total loss. In sudden, localized, disasters this is unlikely to have
major effects on the macroeconomy even in the short term, especially after relief and
rehabilitation are well under way, as shown below (Ibid.). In addition, globalization via trade
integration, financial development and speedy communications is bound to support and foster
the general requirements for enhanced localization and resilience, despite its current
shortcomings. That is, any spreading of a disaster, let alone one approaching a catastrophe, is
highly unlikely in such a scenario.9
4.3. A Macroeconomic Argument
In the above general context, even if the capital stock lost to the disaster were not completely
replaced, it would be unlikely that the economy be affected in the short and medium terms, let
alone in the long term. This can be shown by means of a macroeconomic argument. Setting
aside the normally large overestimation of disaster losses, the argument can be based on well-
supported facts about both localized disasters and developing economies. About the former,
first, capital losses to disaster are not homogeneous and normally lopsided towards the less
productive capital; second, most losses are to the capital stock rather than to income, and
third, reconstruction investment is likely to be of better quality than that of the capital lost.
About developing economies, it is first well known that the growth of output does not depend
on the contribution of the capital stock alone, but also on labor, technology and other societal
requirements. Second, it is accepted that new investment opportunities are more likely to be
taken up when their risks are low, especially when private investment is publicly supported
and protected.  Third, it is also accepted that public investment in infrastructure normally
complements or “crowds in” private investment (Albala & Mamatzakis, 2004; Aschauer,
1988; Taylor, 1983). Furthermore, developing countries exhibit large levels of unused or
underused productive factors, in terms of idle capacity, underemployed labor and other
resources, which may be one of the reasons why inflation is either not significant or very
short-lived after localized disasters. Idle capacity is mostly due to narrow domestic markets
and single primary exports, lack of domestic credits and savings, lack foreign exchange and
expertise, and not least lack of information about investment opportunities and know-how
(Thirlwall, 2003). Some of these constraints are normally weakened, if not lifted, by the
disaster response (Albala-Bertrand, 2004/1993).
In the context of a disaster situation, which includes the impact, the response and derived
societal interference, an economy would normally generate endogenous reactions from within
and from outside the disaster area. For example, market reactions that follow opportunities,
either by filling profitable gaps left by the disaster losses or by complementing new (disaster)
public investment, or both. There will also be economic counteractions via the use of buffer
stocks, like savings and inventories plus fast imported inputs, to partly make up for the initial
losses to both final and intermediate goods. Buffer stocks in a disaster aftermath will
contribute to contain both negative multiplying effects on the economic machinery and the
spreading effects from the disaster zone to the rest of the country (Albala-Bertrand, 1993).
The more diversified and openly integrated and economy was, the more important would
these reactions be. In other words, the disaster itself endogenously creates domestic and
foreign economic incentives and reactions, which are reinforced by public, private and foreign
exogenous responses. New concessional foreign exchange could even relax a foreign-
exchange constraint if this was present before the disaster, as can be shown via a two-gap
model (Taylor, 2004; 1994), increasing investment and hence growth. The stimuli from
disaster-induced incentives may also unlock and create economic opportunities, inducing a
reconstruction investment multiplier larger than the disaster loss multiplier, making the
recovery less costly to undertake and more rapidly to succeed than otherwise it would have
been. But the main argument about localization would actually hold even if there were no
multiplying effect from the disaster response, when the multiplier was equal to unity (Albala-
Bertrand, 2006).10
4.4. A Model for a Localized Disaster
With this framework in mind, an economic model to assess the output effects of a localized
disaster can be articulated as follows (see Albala-Bertrand, 2004/1993). The basic relationship
is that a unit of capital loss will always have a lower impact on future output than one unit of
capital replaced via new investment. That is, on this count, the negative effect of the disaster
impact is always smaller than the positive effect of the disaster response. This is because the
value of the productivity of capital is always smaller than the value of the investment
multiplier, even if the latter were equal to unity, as shown below.
 Impact effect. The output that can be produced with a given stock of capital normally
represents only a fraction of the value of the capital stock, normally around 40 percent of it
(i.e. the ratio total output-to-total capital, or average productivity of capital, is around 0.4).
That is, 2.5 units of average capital would normally produce around one unit of average
output. But first given that disasters affect more the less productive capital types, like
residential and infrastructure capital, then the average productivity foregone to the disaster
will be lower than normal, say half of it. That is, five units of capital loss would represent one
unit of foregone output. And second given that the less productive capital is the more affected
within any capital type, say half of it again, then 10 units of average capital loss would
represent around 1 unit of average foregone output (i.e. the output-to-capital ratio would
actually be only equal to 0.1). Hence, 10 units of capital lost to a disaster would only
represent about one unit of future output loss. Or conversely one unit of capital loss would
represent a one-tenth loss of future output. If we also allow for noncapital contributions, then
the impact of capital losses on future output will be even smaller, but to make our point we
can stick to the moderate capital-output ratio above.
Response effect. In turn, one unit of reconstruction investment will represent at least one unit
of future income, and significantly more via the multiplier. This is because investment
represents both additions to the capital stock and direct income, so while investment is
replacing the disaster loss to the capital stock, it is also increasing the aggregate demand and
therefore income directly. Furthermore, one unit of expenditure on autonomous investment
would normally represent more than one unit of new income over the year, as this expenditure
will undergo several market rounds over the year, which is what we call the multiplier. This
of course requires the existence of underemployed resources, which is a normal feature of
most countries, especially developing ones. It also requires the lifting of some domestic and
foreign constraints via increased information and coordination as well as public support and
foreign exchange availability, which are normal disaster response features (ibid.). So if we
conservatively assume a multiplier equal to two, then the replacement of one unit of capital
loss would represent about two units of new income. If we also allow for the fact that the
capital replacement is normally of better quality than that of the loss, the positive effect would
be greater, but for the purpose of our general argument we can ignore this fact.
 Total effect. Taking both the impact and response together, then a unit of reconstruction
investment would have 20 times more impact on income and output than one unit of capital
loss. That is, one unit of capital loss would represent a one-tenth loss of output, while one unit
of capital replacement would represent 2 units of new output. In other words, to recover the
possible negative effect of disaster loss on future output, reconstruction investment can be
only one-twentieth of total capital loss, in the first aftermath year. That is, if capital loss
represented 10 percent of GDP, then the required ratio of investment to GDP would have to
be only 0.5 percentage points more than otherwise it would have been. As this investment11
ratio is normally around 15 percent of GDP, the post-disaster ratio would require being
around 15.5 percent of GDP, which is not an onerous additional effort. Most countries do
fulfill such a requirement within a year or so. It can also be shown that, after the first post-
disaster year, the required investment ratio can be even more moderate than in the first year to
keep GDP unaffected, as if there was no disaster.
An application of this model to seven large disasters in Latin America (Albala-Bertrand,
2004/1993) appears to confirm the patterns above. For example, the large Guatemalan
earthquake in 1976, which reported a loss-to-GDP ratio of 17 percent, required a total
expenditure ratio (including both investment expenditure and other expenditure) of 1.2
percentage points more than otherwise it would have been, in the first post-disaster year, and
significantly less afterwards. In all the cases in this study, the required investment ratio was
generally fulfilled, making potential growth losses more than compensated either in the year
of the disaster or within the first two post-disaster years. That is, even in the worse cases, the
negative disaster effects on the economy were short-lived and more than compensated
afterwards.
That is why only rarely has a localized disaster a negative impact on GDP even in the first
accounting year. If anything, because of the new disaster-associated opportunities, related
directly to reconstruction or otherwise, and the unlocking of potentials due to public
expenditure, domestic finance and foreign exchange, it is likely that there will be a significant
acceleration of growth. This will normally be confined to the first two or three post-disaster
years, especially but not only in the case of earthquake disasters (Albala-Bertrand; 1993
Charveriat, 2000)
(2). Lastly, and not less important, this is partly the reason why it is
unpersuasive that a localized disaster impact can have important indirect, let alone longer-
term, effects on the economy. And it is also partly the reason why the assertions about the
existence of harmful cumulative disaster effects on the economy are little convincing
(3).
Therefore, reactivity via domestic and foreign linkages in a diversified economic environment
is paramount to explain why disasters might not have the dramatic negative economic effects
that are so commonly portrayed in the mass media and other sources. That is, market behavior
and information, economic diversification and integration, public institutions and expenditure,
and domestic and foreign interactions will all endogenously and exogenously help counteract,
if not outweigh, actual and potential disaster effects.  These processes are likely to be
enhanced by globalization, which would make the possibility of disaster escalation, let alone
national catastrophe, highly unlikely. Notice however that even in the absence of exogenous
response, especially associated with foreign aid, most of this compensation would happen
anyway, as society (and the economy) is not an inert thing but a living organism. A
catastrophe, as defined above, might only happen if a disaster renders economy and society
into either inert objects or fully disorganized social entities, which are an unlikely proposition,
especially in the context of localized disasters.
5. Globalization and Localization
Globalization does appear to help the general process of localization by endogenously
enhancing economic diversity and synergy via all-embracing domestic and foreign economic
networking. These enhanced interlinkages are bound to increase the resilience of an open
national economy, making it more able to insulate from general local failures. But current
globalization policies appear also as contributing to increase local vulnerability, especially in
the case of natural disasters, by disenfranchising local communities, business and individuals12
at a faster pace than their ability to adapt at least in the short and medium terms. So lower
macroeconomic vulnerability is perfectly compatible with higher social (local) vulnerability,
especially that of those directly affected by a disaster.
Globalization.  Globalization is a societal process that widens and deepens the mutual
interactions between the institutions and people of each country and the rest of the world. In
particular, economic globalization refers to the institutions associated with the flows of traded
goods and services, financial and direct capital, migrant labor and tourism, and economic
information and ideas, within a global arena of cultural institutions and traits. This process has
accelerated, as the means of transport and information has cheapened, while global
administrative and communication structures have become more flexible and expedite. The
most vocal advocates of economic globalization, normally associated with the so-called
“Washington Consensus”, claim that as more countries join their preferred and currently
dominant policy package, economic and social benefits for everybody will come over time.
The detractors normally agree that higher levels of global integration could be economically
and socially beneficial, but have serious doubts about the soundness of the economic policies
that are currently pursued for this purpose. Their misgivings are mostly due to the fact that a
rapid, unregulated and socially unaccommodating transition to higher stages of globalization
have often produced deleterious consequences for the economy in general and for the most
vulnerable people in particular. In addition, the transition length towards the expected
equitable benefits of a higher stage of globalization remains so far undefined (see Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 2004, Vol.20, No.1)
(4).
There are increasing problems associated with the deepening and enhancing of economic
globalization via the currently dominant policies, which have been widely studied in the real
world.  First, there appears to be normally a short/medium term increase of vulnerability,
especially of the poorest sections of society, increasing poverty and inequality. The latter
appears as unchecked even in countries that the “Washington Consensus” would consider as
prime example of success, like Chile, which has ended up with the 9
th worse income
distribution in the world (HDR, 2004; Pizarro et al, 1996). Second, there has also been a good
deal of economic instability and economic destruction, associated with unregulated financial
flows and free-trade integration. Free unregulated capital flows have rendered economies
even more unstable and less policy independent than before, which have also carried serious
political instability and social victimization, like in Argentina 2001 (Frenkel, 2003; Damill,
Frenkel & Maurizio, 2003; Weller, 2001; Weisbrot & Baker, 2001). In turn, free-trade
integration has created serious transition cost associated with the fast, uncoordinated and
inequitable domestic structural change that seems required to fit into the global economy
(Grabel, 2002; Rudra, 2002; Eichengreen, 2001). Furthermore, restrictions on international
labor mobility (i.e. a way to weather out unemployment) appear as an uneasy countertrend to
globalization. Lastly, there appears to be a clear asymmetry in the compliance with current
globalization precepts between the developed and developing countries, in favor of the former
(Guadagni & Kaufmann, 2004)
. In fact, no serious economist would argue about the existence
of such actual problems, but about their interpretation and solutions, and not least about their
socially acceptable time-length persistence. Therefore, at least in the medium term, these
processes are likely to render significant numbers of people more differentially at risk and
hence more vulnerable than before. This may have not unimportant consequences for the
globalization project as a whole, but it also shows that current globalization, in its purist
“Washington Consensus” guise, may have significant ideological overtones (Stiglitz, 2002;
Weiss, 2002; Wade, 1996).  There are however proposals for other ways of inserting into the
global economy, which seemingly do not require enduring the worse social and economic13
costs of this enterprise (Stiglitz, 2006; Chang & Grabel, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Nayyard, 2002,
Mansoob, 2002; World Bank, 2001; Wade, 1990).
On this score, globalization may act as a double-edged process. On the one hand, it enhances
the social and economic networking within the domestic economy, and between this and the
global economy, which is likely to increase resilience by both endogenously helping the
confinement of disaster effects (i.e. increasing localization) and helping make endogenous and
exogenous responses more prompt and diverse.  On the other hand, the current policy package
has been shown to cause severe domestic local victimization by upsetting the social and
economic networks of traditional communities, which often act as an informal insurance
against disasters. If the new social and economic re-articulation (to global demands) were fast
and little painful this would not be much of a problem, but it actually seems to exhibit an
undefined persistence, so sounder policies are required (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005). There
might then be the requirement of international concerted efforts to improve the soundness and
safety of globalization policies as an aim in itself, so that the masses of vulnerable people and
activities get a better deal than currently, especially in the face of natural hazards.
5.1. Some Positive Contributions
As regards the event itself, there is little that globalization can do directly, as it would mostly
depend on highly sophisticated technology to alter the strength of earthquakes, hurricanes,
floods and volcanoes at source, which is hardly available (Kunreuther & Rose, Vol. I, Part V,
2004). But it could help by contributing to the setting up of early warning systems and
disseminating information and know how. In turn, regarding the strength of the physical built-
up environment, the main mechanisms to reduce the disaster impact vulnerability are
regulations of buildings and structures, like construction codes, land use licenses, and
regulations about land location and the handling of risky technology. Globalization, via
dissemination of information about best practices, may contribute positively to a better
understanding of design and use of structures as well as their monitoring and legal enforcing.
In addition, insurance can also play a role at this juncture, by disciplining construction and
land use, as conditions to qualify for insurance cover. The requirement to introduce disaster-
risk factors in both cost-benefit analysis and private investment projects, as a condition for
international and domestic loans, can also work towards this aim (Mechler, 2003). But its
effective implementation depends more on the type of society than on globalization itself. So
the role of the state, as a necessary complement or substitute for private markets, should not
be overlooked.
Endogenous (in-built) and exogenous (policy decision) channels of response might get
strengthened by globalization. Foreign trade benefits a country by delinking the domestic
structure of production from that of demand and vice versa.  This diversifies the sources and
markets of inputs and outputs. This is bound to increase the localization of a disaster, as the
output and capital losses as well as the ensuing demand losses in the disaster zone can now be
more easily made up with alternative domestic and foreign markets
(5). This may not only
reduce even more effectively the potential for widespread effects on the macroeconomy, but
also change the structure of supplies and demands towards more stable markets. This may
promptly shelter and compensate the macroeconomy from unwanted indirect flow effects, but
it may also put out of business a number of affected economic activities in the disaster zone.
So while the disaster becomes even more economically localized than before, it might also
worsen the plight of affected communities by passing them over. But if the macroeconomy is
not affected, then it should be more expedite and less onerous for the affected country to14
counter the effects in the disaster zone, but that would depends more on the domestic power
structures than on globalization.  Notice that a wide and fast opening to international trade is
likely to have also a number of serious problems for developing countries 
(6).
Emergency relief and emergency rehabilitation are likely to be enhanced by globalization via
macro insulation, local integration, buffer reactions and general exogenous resources. Once
the emergency response has contained the spread and the deepening of indirect effects, the
basis for start reversing the direct effects would be feasible. This would come in the shape of
physical reconstruction plans, which is partly an exogenous type of activity, but financing
from insurance, market reactions and other in-built systems would also be involved. These
responses do require public involvement out of public finance via contingency funds, new
grants and subsidies, tax and bills write-offs, and the like. But it would also require foreign
aid and credits, including material, technical and labor assistance. This can complement in-
built financial mechanisms that transfer risk and that increase the available funding for
reconstruction, i.e. financial anticipatory mechanisms either as a specific disaster aim or as an
incidental by-product of financial deepening. This takes us to the second main plank of
globalization, the development of domestic financial markets and its integration to a global
financial market, in terms of bank loans, portfolio investment and foreign direct investment.
These are meant to increase greatly in coverage and depth, via the development and creation
of financial instruments and products. Setting aside the serious problem of domestic (lack of)
regulation of foreign financial flows, as indicated above, a more developed financial market
would include some mechanisms to fund, spread, transfer and reduce risk and vulnerability.
Instruments like disaster insurance and reinsurance, catastrophe bonds and weather
derivatives, hedge funds and disaster credit, reserve funds and remittances, are all part of the
current need to establish a financial architecture aimed at disaster vulnerability reduction
(Andersen, 2002; Keipel & Tison, 2002; Doherty, 2000; Kunreuther, 1996)
(7).
6. Conclusions
Disasters may impose large residential, infrastructure and agricultural losses as well as large
death tolls and injuries within the disaster zone, but it is highly likely that these losses and
problems will be economically localized. Economically localized losses of capital and
activities, death tolls and injuries are unlikely to affect significantly the macroeconomy in the
short term, let alone in the longer term. In such a context it is highly unlikely that a disaster
can turn into catastrophe. In addition, given that a macroeconomy would unlikely be affected
by an economically localized disaster, communities and activities directly affected should be
the main target of response policies, rather than the unwarranted belief that the economy as a
whole would be impaired.
The positive features of current globalization seem to contribute to further enhance
localization. It can also provide new opportunities for both improving physical prevention and
diversifying risk, which would depend not only on domestic society and its ruling regime, but
also on globalization policies and their social concern. But its negative features may increase
direct local victimization via the impairment of local endogenous mechanisms of response by
perverse effects associated with international trade and capital flows. In addition, if
globalization induces the synchronization of the economic cycle across countries, then
remittances and foreign aid may strongly suffer in a downturn.
Development itself appears to be a process whereby all disasters become more economically
localized. That is, “disasters are primarily a problem of development, but essentially not a15
problem  for development” (Albala-Bertrand, 1993, p. 202). Thus, any policy process
contributing to a diversified, integrative and sustainable development must incidentally
contribute to reducing economic and social vulnerability to disasters, as in developed
countries. It is therefore difficult to imagine a realistic scenario in which a disaster could
become catastrophic, even less so in developed countries
(8).16
Notes
(1) Once a disaster impact has occurred, three main types of effects ensue: direct (or stock)
effects, indirect (or flow) effects and societal interfering (or institutional) effects. Direct
effects have an impact on the quality and levels of human populations (injury and deaths)
as well as on the quality and levels of physical and animal stocks (damage and
destruction). In turn, indirect effects derive from the disarticulations caused by the direct
effects, affecting the interrelations between physical structures and between people, which
translate into flow or functioning failures in the economy, public activities, household
conditions and the states of health and nutrition. For example, for the economic system,
direct effects represent losses to the capital stock and labor, whereas indirect effects
represent losses to functioning flows, in terms of foregone production and income, savings
and investment, productivity and efficiency, and the like. In addition, there are some
societal interfering effects from the impact and the response, which are bound to have
some variable degree of intromission in normal society and economy, making the
prevailing resources undergo some rationalization and redirection, affecting institutional
patterns. In the case of natural disasters, this is mostly an incidental and short-lived effect
of a disaster situation. For socially made disasters, like complex emergencies or
technological hazards, the institutional effect is more all embracing, as the triggering
event, the proneness and vulnerability to breakdowns are themselves both institutionally
based and due to institutional failure. Societal interference can be expressed in short-term
changes in private savings and stocks, in shifting of supply and demand sources, in
shifting of investment opportunities and credit sources, in public and trade deficits, in
changes in inflation and relative prices, in changes in capital flows and remittances. But it
can also be seen in terms of institutional changes, translating into fragmentation and
politicization, technological changes and migration, corruption and speculation, and in the
stimulation of less common long-term changes in economic and political structures (see
Albala-Bertrand, 1993).
(2) It would not be difficult to entertain the notion that, by virtue of development itself, if
disasters with the same geophysical characteristics were to strike the same countries in the
same places, the loss of life would be significantly smaller, because of better design and
better people’s reaction to disaster. In turn, the losses of capital stock, in money terms,
would likely be higher, if anything because urban property in large cities has both become
significantly more expensive and more concentrated via vertical construction. But the
GDP effects would be significantly smaller than then, as functioning flows would likely
be less affected by virtue of higher localization, and therefore less macroeconomic
vulnerability. This is what normally happens in developed countries in the face of
disasters.
(3) As indirect, long-term and cumulative effects of disasters are intractable to direct
observation, then most disaster “experts” and observers, like relief operators and
journalists, but also academics and international staff, normally get away with
uncheckable and unfalsifiable statements. These assertions then feed back and are
repeated by everybody else as a buzzword. Many of these sources may actually have
vested interests in keeping the fiction about the importance of these effects, as shown in
Albala-Bertrand (1993). A term like “merchants of apocalypse”  would not be
inappropriate to refer to them. In turn, some studies via abstract modeling also attempt to
establish their importance. The latter are interesting but normally fail in their realism. For
example, a study by Freeman et al (2002), for some regions prone to floods and other17
localized disasters in some Latin American countries, heavily relies upon fixed
coefficients, an actuarial concept of losses and an inert conception of society. Fixed
coefficient would normally be a problem for any projection beyond three to five years, but
more so in the case of a serious upheaval coming from disaster. The actuarial concept
might be useful for isolated items, but certainly not for social processes.  And associated
with the latter, the inert approach to society is simply untenable. Society, including the
economy, is not a collection of inert items or a static cake, which can be wind up as a toy
or cut to size, but a living organism that generates societally endogenous reactions. These
are bound to produce adaptations, substitutions, economic shifts, migration,
diversification, and other in-built societal traits, altering somehow the dynamics and
structure of the affected location and country (see Albala-Bertrand, 1993).
(4) The “Washington Consensus” represents a package of neoliberal policies agreed mainly
by US officials, the IMF and the World Bank in the mid1980s, in connection to the
required stabilization and structural adjustment of the countries affected by the 1980s debt
crisis (Stiglitz, 1998). This became later the policy package behind the dominant model of
current globalization. Its main components are free foreign trade, specialization via (static)
comparative advantages, liberalization of capital flows, the “flexibilization” of the labor
market, balanced budgets and privatization, a minimal and subsidiary role for the state,
and the deregulation of most if not all price signals (Williamson, 1990; Fischer, 2003).
The main alternative, and more successful, model of globalization seems to be the Asian
Model, followed by Taiwan and South Korea, based upon the economic experience of
Japan after World War II. Here the state has an important role to play, as free markets are
not considered as self-adjusting towards the best socioeconomic outcome for industrial
policy, employment, growth rates, technological sophistication, income distribution and
poverty. These Asian countries observe the best levels on all these counts among most
countries, let alone developing countries (Chang, 1996; Chang & Grabel 2004).
(5) A qualification seems necessary here, as for undiversified developing economies,
especially agricultural monoproducers and exporters, globalization policies are no
panacea, as it condemns countries to such production for longer than necessary. That is,
free-trade agreements prevents countries from protecting infant industries and developing
industrial policy a la Taiwan and South Korea, i.e. the two most successful developing
countries since World War II.
(6) The downsides of unfettered international trade are manifold. Firstly, there will be an
initial destruction of indigenous uncompetitive firms and a probably long lasting
confinement to the production of primary products (Weiss, 2002), increasing general
vulnerability and disaster vulnerability in passing.  This is the consequence of the
elimination of tariff and other trade protections, which is demanded by the WTO for
foreign trade agreements (FTAs), not always readily observed by OECD countries.
Secondly, it may also make the economy more vulnerable to international fluctuations,
again weakening domestic response in the event of disaster. And third it may also stifle
domestic technological sophistication and the economic efficiency of domestic
intermediate inputs, which may in the long run make an economy less flexible to adapt to
sudden changes. So the positive aspects of free trade have to be balanced against the
negative ones when analyzing it, let alone when designing policy for the real world and
current generations (Chang & Grabel, 2004; Andersen, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002; Albala-
Bertrand, 2006; 1999; Chang, 1996).18
(7) The impact of a natural or technological disaster might be at least partly absorbed via
improved access to this set of instruments and via better information about risk vis-à-vis
materials and design. But for as long as the collateral requirements were not readily
available, loans and other forms of financial protection might not reach the people who
need it most in the wake of disaster. Insurance premiums might be an unaffordable cost
for precisely the people and activities more likely to be directly affected by a disaster
impact. Still, the easier availability of these products for firms and employers might
reduce the livelihood vulnerability of employees, even if the latter cannot afford insurance
of their own. But, even if the domestic and international financial market for insurance
were easily available, voluntary insurance and other risk-transfer instruments, are as a
norm poorly demanded (Kunreuther, 1997; Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Giarini, 1984;
Cochrane, 1975; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969). All this requires government intervention at
all levels for effective reactions to potential and actual impact effects (Godschack et al
1998; Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Dreze & Sen, 1990/91; Miletti & Sorensen, 1988).
(8) The rather sensationalist title of Workshop III of the conference, i.e. “Escalation from
Disaster to Catastrophe”, seems catchy, but misleading, as in European countries the
possibility of catastrophe from natural or technological disasters may be closer to fiction
than fact. A more down-to-earth title would have been “Understanding and Tackling
Indirect Disaster Effects”.19
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